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Based on quantum entanglement, an all-or-nothing oblivious transfer protocol is proposed and is
proven to be secure. The distinct merit of the present protocol lies in that it is not based on quantum
bit commitment. More intriguingly, this OT protocol does not belong to a class of protocols denied
by the Lo’s no-go theorem of one-sided two-party secure computation, and thus its security can be
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I. INTRODUCTION
The research on the oblivious transfer (OT) problem
may be traced back to more than twenty years ago[1, 2].
Kilian[3] pointed out later that OT is very important
in two-party and multi-party protocols. This is because
in most symmetrical protocols, the participants always
know each others’ data. If some participants are dishon-
est or try to get extra information, the protocols become
insecure. OT can create some secret between the par-
ticipants and break this symmetry. Thus it can be used
to implement multi-party protocols such as two-party se-
cure computation[4]. However, the security of classical
cryptography usually has to be based on some strong
computational assumptions, such as the hardness of fac-
toring. If quantum computers become practical in the
future, the validity of these assumptions can be broken
easily[5]. Therefore significant interests have been paid
to look for quantum methods applicable to cryptogra-
phy to achieve better security[6, 7]. Quantum oblivi-
ous transfer (QOT) protocols were also proposed[8]. But
they are secure only under the assumption that the par-
ticipants cannot delay the quantum measurement. To
fix the problem, Cre´peau[9] proposed a QOT protocol
based on quantum bit commitment (QBC). It was fur-
ther proven by Yao [10] that such a QOT is secure if
QBC is secure. Nevertheless, it was indicated later by
Mayers, Lo and Chau that all the QBC protocols for-
merly proposed[6, 11] are insecure. Furthermore, it was
concluded that unconditionally secure QBC scheme can-
not be achieved in principle[12, 13], which is referred to
as the Mayers-Lo-Chau (MLC) no-go theorem and is a
serious drawback in quantum cryptography. According
to the theorem, all QBC based protocols are insecure,
including quantum coin tossing[6, 14, 15, 16] and quan-
tum oblivious mutual identification[17]. Consequently,
QOT based on QBC is insecure unless the participants
are restricted to individual measurements[18].
On the other hand, starting with QBC is not the only
way to implement QOT. Therefore, it is natural to ask
whether we can design a QOT protocol with stand-alone
security. Although it was concluded independently that
other two-party quantum secure computations including
QOT are not possible either [19, 20], the conclusion is
essentially based on a crucial point that the quantum
state used in the two-party computation protocols is the
simultaneous eigenstate of different measurement opera-
tors, which follows from two basic requirements in their
definition of the so-called ideal one-sided two-party se-
cure computation[19]: Alice helps Bob to compute a pre-
scribed function f(i, j) in such a way that, at the end of
the protocol, (a) Bob learns f(i, j) unambiguously, and
(b) Alice learns nothing. In this paper, a novel quan-
tum OT protocol is proposed, which is neither based on
QBC nor satisfying rigorously the requirement (a); but
it indeed meets the rigorous security requirement of the
OT definition. Therefore, our OT protocol is a kind of
two-party secure computation different from that defined
by Lo in Ref.[19] and thus evades the Lo’s no-go theorem
of the one-sided two-party secure computation, allowing
more quantum-cryptography applications than thought
possible previously.
In the next section, a new QOT protocol is elaborated
in details. Then a general proof of its unconditional secu-
rity is presented in Sec. III. Finally, the relationship be-
tween the protocol and the no-go theorems is addressed.
II. THE SCHEME
Although there are various types of OT, as a typical il-
lustration, we here focus only on a basic type OT studied
in Refs.[1, 10], which is also called all-or-nothing OT. A
sender Alice wants to transfer a secret bit b ∈ {0, 1} to a
receiver Bob. At the end of the protocol, either Bob could
learn the value of b with the reliability (which means the
2probability for Bob’s output b to be equal to Alice’s in-
put) 100%, or he has zero knowledge on b. Each possibil-
ity should occur with the probability 1/2, and which one
happens finally is out of their control. Meanwhile, Alice
should learn nothing about which event takes place.
Consider an ideal case without transmission error.
Similar to the conjugate coding[2], letting |0〉+ and |1〉+
denote the two orthogonal states of a qubit, we can
define |r〉× ≡ (|0〉+ + (−1)r |1〉+)/
√
2 (r = 0, 1), the
Bell states Φ± ≡ (|0〉+ |0〉+ ± |1〉+ |1〉+)/
√
2, and Ψ± ≡
(|0〉+ |1〉+ ± |1〉+ |0〉+)/
√
2 , where + (×) stands for the
rectilinear (diagonal) basis. The key idea of our protocol
is: Alice and Bob share many sets of 4 qubits in an en-
tangled state |ψ〉 (see Eq.(1) below). To each set, four
two-value parameters q, r, c, and d are associated, where
{q, r} and {c, d} correspond respectively to the state |ψ〉
and the choice/measurement of individual participant;
the form of |ψ〉 designed by us ensures that Alice cannot
decode simultaneously any two of q, r and d, and Bob
cannot decode c and q (or r) simultaneously. Relying on
appropriate verification and use of state, a secure OT can
be achieved.
For easy readability, before presenting a complete ver-
sion of our protocol, we first account for the details in
several key procedures comprehensibly.
(i) Preparation of the states:
Our protocol is based on the four-qubit entangled state
with the following form
|ψ〉 = |ψA1ψA2ψB1ψB2〉
= (|0〉+ |0〉+ |0〉+ |0〉+
+ |1〉+ |1〉+ |0〉+ |1〉+
+ |0〉× |0〉× |1〉+ |0〉+
+ |1〉× |1〉× |1〉+ |1〉+)/2. (1)
Bob prepares many sets of such states. For each set, he
keeps systems B1 and B2 and sends systems A1 and A2
to Alice.
(ii) Alice inputting c:
In Alice’s point of view, Bob sends her any of the four
two-qubit states |r〉q |r〉q (q ∈ {+,×}, r ∈ {0, 1}) with
the equal probability. Now let us consider Alice’s strat-
egy to decode either q or r. In the Bell basis
C0 ≡ {Φ+,Φ−,Ψ+,Ψ−}, (2)
the four possible |r〉q |r〉q can be expressed as
|0〉+ |0〉+ = (Φ+ +Φ−)/
√
2,
|1〉+ |1〉+ = (Φ+ − Φ−)/
√
2,
|0〉× |0〉× = (Φ+ +Ψ+)/
√
2,
|1〉× |1〉× = (Φ+ −Ψ+)/
√
2. (3)
If Alice measures systems A1 and A2 in the C0 basis, she
will know that q = + (q = ×) if the outcome is Φ− (Ψ+).
While if the outcome is Φ+, she will not know the value
of q. Since Eq.(1) can be rewritten as
|ψ〉 = Φ− |0〉+ |1〉× /2 +Ψ+ |1〉+ |1〉× /2
+Φ+ |0〉× |0〉× /
√
2, (4)
it can be seen that the probability for Alice to decode q
successfully is 1/2.
On the other hand, defining the basis
C1 ≡ {|0〉× |0〉+ , |0〉× |1〉+ , |1〉× |0〉+ , |1〉× |1〉+}, (5)
|r〉q |r〉q can be expressed as
|0〉+ |0〉+ = (|0〉× |0〉+ + |1〉× |0〉+)/
√
2,
|1〉+ |1〉+ = (|0〉× |1〉+ − |1〉× |1〉+)/
√
2,
|0〉× |0〉× = (|0〉× |0〉+ + |0〉× |1〉+)/
√
2,
|1〉× |1〉× = (|1〉× |0〉+ − |1〉× |1〉+)/
√
2. (6)
That is, if Alice measures them in the C1 basis, she will
know that r = 0 (r = 1) if the outcome is |0〉× |0〉+
(|1〉× |1〉+), while she does not know r if the outcome is|0〉× |1〉+ or |1〉× |0〉+. Again, rewriting Eq.(1) as
|ψ〉 = |0〉× |0〉+ |0〉× |0〉+ /2− |1〉× |1〉+ |0〉× |1〉+ /2
+ |0〉× |1〉+Ψ+/2 + |1〉× |0〉+ Φ+/2, (7)
we see that the probability for Alice to decode r success-
fully is also 1/2. Also, since the bases C0 and C1 are not
commutable, Alice cannot decode the values of q and r
simultaneously (A rigorous proof will be provided in the
next section).
In our protocol, Alice should randomly picks a different
bit c ∈ {0, 1} for each set of |ψ〉 at this stage. If c = 0
(c = 1), she tries to decode q (r) by measuring her share
of the set in the C0 (C1) basis. After she measures all
|ψ〉, she will decode either q or r successfully for about
half of these sets, while she fails to decode anything for
the other half. She tells Bob to discard the half which
she failed to decode, while keeps the rest sets of |ψ〉 in
the following steps.
Bob can verify whether Alice has input c and finished
her measurement by picking randomly some |ψ〉 from the
remaining half, and asking Alice to announce either q
or r, depending on what she decoded. To find out the
correct value of q or r, as can be seen from Eq.(1), Bob
can simply measures systems B1 and B2 of the picked
|ψ〉 in the basis
D0 ≡ {|0〉+ |0〉+ , |0〉+ |1〉+ , |1〉+ |0〉+ , |1〉+ |1〉+}. (8)
Then he learns which |r〉q |r〉q systems A1 and A2 can
collapse to. If Alice has delayed her measurement or
adopted any other measurement which is less efficient
than the above strategies on decode q or r with certainty,
she cannot always announce q or r correctly, or she has
to discard more than half of the sets. Therefore a dis-
honest Alice will inevitably be caught as the increase of
the number of |ψ〉 picked for the verification.
3Nevertheless, to pass the verification, Alice needs
not to perform complete measurement in the C0
(C1) basis. She can simply try to project systems
A1 and A2 to the subspace supported by {Φ−,Ψ+}
({|0〉× |0〉+ , |1〉× |1〉+}). If the projection fails, she tells
Bob to discard the corresponding |ψ〉. While if the pro-
jection is successful, she keeps systems A1 and A2 en-
tangled with B1 and B2 without collapsing them into a
pure state Φ− or Ψ+ (|0〉× |0〉+ or |1〉× |1〉+). She fin-
ishes the complete measurement to make them collapse
only when the corresponding |ψ〉 is picked for the verifi-
cation. Therefore in general, the state of the remaining
undiscarded and unverified sets of |ψ〉 is either∣∣∣ψ(0)〉 = Φ− |0〉+ |1〉× /√2 + Ψ+ |1〉+ |1〉× /√2 (9)
if c = 0, or∣∣∣ψ(1)〉 = |0〉× |0〉+ |0〉× |0〉+ /√2−|1〉× |1〉+ |0〉× |1〉+ /√2
(10)
if c = 1. After the verification, Alice and Bob keep these
|ψ〉 and proceed.
(iii) Bob inputting d:
Since the state of systems B1 and B2 are different in
Eqs.(9) and (10), Bob can learn Alice’s choice of c or
her outcome s with a certain probability. Here Alice’s
outcome s is defined as
s ≡
{
Q, (c = 0),
r, (c = 1),
(11)
where Q = 0, 1 for q = +,×. From Eq.(1) we can see
that if Bob measures systems B1 and B2 in the D0 ba-
sis defined in Eq.(8) and the outcome is |0〉+ |0〉+ (or
|1〉+ |1〉+), he will know that systems A1 and A2 can only
collapse to the state |0〉+ |0〉+ (or |1〉× |1〉×). These two
states have the common feature Q = r. Thus Bob knows
that s = 0 (s = 1) despite he does not know c.
Note that at this stage, |ψ〉 already collapsed to
∣∣ψ(0)〉
or
∣∣ψ(1)〉 by Alice’s measurement. With the D0 basis,
they can be expressed as∣∣∣ψ(0)〉 = [Φ−(|0〉+ |0〉+ − |0〉+ |1〉+)
+Ψ+(|1〉+ |0〉+ − |1〉+ |1〉+)]/2, (12)
and ∣∣∣ψ(1)〉 = [|0〉× |0〉+ (|0〉+ |0〉+ + |1〉+ |0〉+)
− |1〉× |1〉+ (|0〉+ |1〉+ + |1〉+ |1〉+)]/2.(13)
Thus the probability for Bob to decode s successfully is
1/2.
On the other hand, defining the basis
D1 ≡ {|0〉× |0〉× , |0〉× |1〉× , |1〉× |0〉× , |1〉× |1〉×}, (14)∣∣ψ(0)〉 or ∣∣ψ(1)〉 can be expressed as∣∣∣ψ(0)〉 = (Φ−−Ψ+) |1〉× |1〉× /2+(Φ−+Ψ+) |0〉× |1〉× /2,
(15)
and ∣∣∣ψ(1)〉 = (|0〉× |0〉+ − |1〉× |1〉+) |0〉× |0〉× /2
+(|0〉× |0〉+ + |1〉× |1〉+) |0〉× |1〉× /2. (16)
If Bob measures systems B1 and B2 in the D1 basis, he
will know that c = 0 (c = 1) if the outcome is |1〉× |1〉×
(|0〉× |0〉×), while he does not know c if the outcome is|0〉× |1〉×. The probability for him to decode c success-
fully is also 1/2. Again, Bob cannot decode the values
of s and c simultaneously since the bases D0 and D1 are
not commutable.
In the protocol, Bob randomly picks a different bit
d ∈ {0, 1} for each remaining set of |ψ〉, where d = 0
should occur with the probability p = 2/3 (we will see
later why this value is chosen). If d = 0 (d = 1), he
tries to decode s (c) by measuring his share of the set
in the D0 (D1) basis. After he measures all sets of |ψ〉,
he will decode either s or c successfully for about half of
those sets, while he fails to decode anything for the other
half. He tells Alice to discard the half which he failed to
decode, while keeping the rest |ψ〉 for the following steps.
Similar to (ii), Alice can verify whether Bob has in-
put d and finished his measurement honestly by picking
randomly some |ψ〉 from the remaining half, and asking
Bob to announce either s or c, depending on what he
decoded. She should also check whether Bob has indeed
input d = 0 with the required probability p = 2/3, and
whether the number of discarded |ψ〉 is about a half.
Also, Bob needs not to perform a complete measure-
ment in the D0 (D1) basis to pass the verification. If
he has chosen d = 0 (d = 1), he simply tries to
project systems B1 and B2 to the subspace supported by
{|0〉+ |0〉+ , |1〉+ |1〉+} ({|0〉× |0〉× , |1〉× |1〉×}), and dis-
cards |ψ〉 if the projection fails. He finishes the complete
measurement to make the undiscarded |ψ〉 collapse only
when it is picked for the verification. Therefore after the
verification, the state of the remaining unverified |ψ〉 is∣∣∣ψ(00)〉 = (Φ− |0〉+ |0〉+ −Ψ+ |1〉+ |1〉+)/√2 (17)
if c = 0 and d = 0, or∣∣∣ψ(10)〉 = (|0〉× |0〉+ |0〉+ |0〉+ − |1〉× |1〉+ |1〉+ |1〉+)/√2
(18)
if c = 1 and d = 0, or∣∣∣ψ(01)〉 = (Φ− −Ψ+) |1〉× |1〉× /√2, (19)
if c = 0 and d = 1, or∣∣∣ψ(11)〉 = (|0〉× |0〉+ − |1〉× |1〉+) |0〉× |0〉× /√2, (20)
if c = 1 and d = 1.
Before using these states for the OT, Bob must prevent
Alice from knowing his choice of d for each of them. It
4can be accomplished with the following method.
∣∣ψ(00)〉
and
∣∣ψ(10)〉 can be rewritten as
∣∣∣ψ(00)〉 = (Φ− +Ψ+)Φ−/2 + (Φ− −Ψ+)Φ+/2, (21)
and ∣∣∣ψ(10)〉 = (|0〉× |0〉+ + |1〉× |1〉+)Φ−/2
+(|0〉× |0〉+ − |1〉× |1〉+)Φ+/2. (22)
If Bob has chosen d = 0, he tries to project systems
B1 and B2 to the state Φ
+, and tells Alice to discard
the corresponding |ψ〉 if the projection fails. Then the
remaining
∣∣ψ(00)〉 and ∣∣ψ(10)〉 collapse to
∣∣∣ψ(00a)〉 = (Φ− −Ψ+)Φ+/√2, (23)
and ∣∣∣ψ(10a)〉 = (|0〉× |0〉+ − |1〉× |1〉+)Φ+/√2. (24)
We can see that the states of systems A1 and A2 of∣∣ψ(00a)〉 and ∣∣ψ(10a)〉 (which are corresponding to d = 0)
are exactly the same as those of
∣∣ψ(01)〉 and ∣∣ψ(11)〉 (cor-
responding to d = 1) respectively. Therefore Alice can
by no means distinguish them apart so she cannot know
d from the remaining |ψ〉.
Now let us explain why Bob should choose d = 0 with
the probability p = 2/3. Eqs.(21) and (22) show that
half of the |ψ〉 corresponding to d = 0 will be further
discarded when collapsing
∣∣ψ(00)〉 and ∣∣ψ(10)〉 to ∣∣ψ(00a)〉
and
∣∣ψ(10a)〉. Meanwhile, no |ψ〉 corresponding to d = 1
will be discarded after Alice has verified Bob’s action.
Therefore among all the remaining |ψ〉, d = 0 and d = 1
will occur with the equal probability 1/2, which will be
useful below.
(iv) Completing the OT:
At this stage, for any remaining |ψ〉, Alice knows her
own choice c but not Bob’s choice d, while Bob has chosen
d = 0 (i.e. he does not knows c) and d = 1 (he knows c)
with the equal probability 1/2. Thus Alice can randomly
pick any one of the remaining |ψ〉, and use c to encode
the bit b she wants to transfer. If by chance Bob knows
c for this chosen |ψ〉, he can decode b successfully. Else
he knows nothing about b. Because the two results will
occur with the equal probability 1/2, the goal of OT is
accomplished.
The above procedure is summarized as the protocol
below, with the corresponding schematic flow chart being
illustrated in Fig.1.
Protocol OT
(1) Preparation of the states: Bob prepares n sets of
|ψ〉 as described in Eq.(1). He keeps systems B1 and B2
of each |ψ〉 and sends systems A1 and A2 to Alice;
(2) Alice inputting c:
(2-1) For each |ψ〉, Alice views the state of systems
A1 and A2 as |r〉q |r〉q, and she randomly picks c ∈ {0, 1}.
If c = 0, She tries to decode q by projecting the two
qubits into Φ− and Ψ+, and she sets q = + (q = ×) if
the outcome is Φ− (Ψ+). Else if c = 1, Alice tries to
decode r by projecting the two qubits into |0〉× |0〉+ and
|1〉× |1〉+, and she sets r = 0 (r = 1) if the outcome is|0〉× |0〉+ (|1〉× |1〉+);
(2-2) If the projection in (2-1) fails, Alice tells Bob
to discard the corresponding |ψ〉;
(3) Verification 1:
(3-1) If the number of the remaining |ψ〉 is n′ ∽
n/2 they continue[21], else they abort the procedure;
(3-2) Bob randomly picks some of the remaining
|ψ〉 and asks Alice to announce either their q or r de-
pending on the value of c. To check Alice’s announce-
ment, Bob measures ψB1ψB2 in the D0 basis, and uses
the result to calculate q, r that corresponds to ψA1ψA2 ;
(3-3) Alice randomly picks some other remaining
|ψ〉 and asks Bob to announce both q and r. Bob per-
forms the same measurement in (3-2) to obtain q, r to
announce;
(3-4) If {no conflicting results were found by both
participants} AND {the probabilities for |r〉q |r〉q =
|0〉+ |0〉+, |r〉q |r〉q = |1〉+ |1〉+, |r〉q |r〉q = |0〉× |0〉× and
|r〉q |r〉q = |1〉× |1〉× to occur are approximately the
same}, they keep the remaining undiscarded and unver-
ified |ψ〉 and continue;
(4) Bob inputting d:
(4-1) For each of the remaining m sets of |ψ〉, Bob
picks d = 0 with the probability p = 2/3 and d = 1
with the probability (1 − p) = 1/3. If d = 0, he tries to
decode s (defined as Eq.(11)) by projecting ψB1ψB2 into
the subspace supported by {|0〉+ |0〉+ , |1〉+ |1〉+}. Else
if d = 1, Bob tries to decode c by projecting ψB1ψB2
into |1〉× |1〉× and |0〉× |0〉×. If the outcome is |1〉× |1〉×
(|0〉× |0〉×), he knows that Alice has chosen c = 0 (c = 1);
(4-2) If the projection in (4-1) fails, Bob tells Alice
to discard the corresponding |ψ〉;
(5) Verification 2:
(5-1) If the number of the remaining |ψ〉 is about
m/2 they continue; else they abort the procedure;
(5-2) Alice randomly picks some of the remain-
ing |ψ〉 and asks Bob to announce either c or s depend-
ing on the value of d. Note that if d = 0, Bob needs
to complete the measurement on ψB1ψB2 in the basis
{|0〉+ |0〉+ , |1〉+ |1〉+}, and he announces s = 0 (s = 1) if
the outcome is |0〉+ |0〉+ (|1〉+ |1〉+);
(5-3) If {no conflicting results were found} AND
{d = 0 occurs with the probability 2/3}, they keep the
remaining undiscarded and unverified |ψ〉 and continue;
(6) Bob preventing Alice from knowing d: For each
remaining |ψ〉 which Bob has chosen d = 0, he tries to
project ψB1ψB2 into the state Φ
+, and tells Alice to dis-
card the corresponding |ψ〉 if the projection fails;
(7) OT part:
(7-1) Alice randomly picks one of the remaining
|ψ〉 and tells Bob b′ = b⊕ c;
5(7-2) If Bob has chosen d = 1 for this |ψ〉 he cal-
culates b = b′ ⊕ c. Else he knows that he fails to get
b.
III. PROOF OF SECURITY
We now prove generally that the protocol is secure
against any cheating strategy in three steps: (I) the form
of |ψ〉 limits the knowledge of Alice and Bob; (II) the
verifications limit both participants’ behaviors to honest
ones; and (III) if Bob does not prepare |ψ〉 honestly, his
knowledge on the data will be even worse.
Alice Bob
Prepare the states
ψ   (Eq.(1))
Input c
c = 0 c = 1
Eq.(4) Eq.(7)
Discard if fail to decode
)0(ψ  (Eq.(9)) )1(ψ  (Eq.(10))
Verification 1
Input d Input d
d = 1 d = 0d = 0 d = 1
Eq.(15) Eq.(12) Eq.(13) Eq.(16)
Discard if fail to decode
)00(ψ
(Eq.(17))
)01(ψ
(Eq.(19))
)10(ψ
(Eq.(18))
 
)11(ψ
(Eq.(20))
Discard if +Φ≠
21 BB
ψψ
)00( aψ
(Eq.(23))
)10( aψ
(Eq.(24))
Alice randomly picks one for OT
d = 1 ?
Y N
Get b
Get
nothing
Verification 2
FIG. 1: A schematic flow chart of Protocol OT. The boxes
on the left (right) represent the local operations on Alice’s
(Bob’s) side, while the middle ones are those requiring collab-
oration of them. The width of the lines denote qualitatively
the number of the states.
(I) For the state |ψ〉 given in Eq.(1), Alice cannot learn
q, r and d simultaneously with the reliability 100%, and
Bob cannot learn s and c simultaneously with the relia-
bility 100%.
Proof: Let ρ0 (ρ1) denote the reduced density matrix
of the quantum state on Alice’s side corresponding to
q = q0 and r = r0 (q 6= q0 and r 6= r0). To make
sure that q = q0 and r = r0 simultaneously, Alice needs
to distinguish ρ0 from ρ1. It can be proven that the
optimal strategy for her to identify ρ0 with the reliability
100% is to measure the states in the basis in which ρ1 is
diagonalized. Supposing that ρ0 and ρ1 are expressed in
this basis with ρ(k, l) denoting the element of the matrix
ρ, the maximum probability for identifying ρ0 is
p0max =
∑
k∈{k|ρ1(k,k)=0}
ρ0(k, k). (25)
When |ψ〉 takes the form as specified in Eq.(1), it is shown
that {k|ρ1(k, k) = 0} = φ (the empty set) regardless of
the values of q and r. Therefore p0max = 0, which means
that Alice can never learn the exact values of q and r si-
multaneously with the reliability 100%. Similarly, it can
also be proven that Bob cannot learn s and c simultane-
ously with the reliability 100%.
As for d, by comparing Eqs.(19) with (23) and Eqs.(20)
with (24) respectively, we can see that after the step (6),
the final states of systems A1 and A2 are exactly the same
regardless Bob’s choice of d. Therefore Alice cannot learn
d as long as the protocol can indeed force the participants
to perform the honest measurement. This leads us to the
next point of the proof.
(II) For the state |ψ〉, the steps (3-1) and (3-2) can
force Alice to measure the states honestly in the step (2),
and the step (5) can force Bob to measure the states hon-
estly in the step (4).
Proof: Consider Alice’s cheating first. Suppose that
in the step (3-2), there are totally δn′ sets of |ψ〉 which
have not been measured by Alice honestly. Instead, she
applies a minimal-error measurement or even delays the
measurement. Then she does not know their q or r with
the reliability 100%, but only with a reliability being not
larger than ε. As Bob picks randomly many |ψ〉 to check
if Alice knows q or r, the probability for Alice to pass
the test is εO(δn). Meanwhile, since only one |ψ〉 is ran-
domly picked for the OT at the final stage, the probabil-
ity for these δ sets of |ψ〉 to be picked is not greater than∑min(δn′,m)
i=1 C
i
δn′C
m−i
n′−i/C
m
n′ . The order of magnitude of
this probability is O(δ) as long as n >> m. Therefore
the total probability for Alice to cheat successfully is
bounded by O(δ)εO(δn), which can be made arbitrarily
small as n→∞.
Thus Alice cannot use the minimal-error measurement,
but has to use the measurements which always decode q
or r with the reliability 100%. Here it is shown that
the honest measurement is the optimal one among all
these measurements. Using the method described in (I),
let ρ0 and ρ1 be the density matrices for q = + and ×
6respectively (being independent of r). In the Bell ba-
sis, both ρ0 and ρ1 are diagonalized. The maximum
probabilities for Alice to identify them are the same:
p0max = p1max = 1/2, which can be reached simulta-
neously in the same measurement. Thus the maximum
probability for Alice to decode q with the reliability 100%
is p = (p0max+p1max)/2 = 1/2. And the operation in the
step (2) is just the strategy that can reach this maximum.
The calculation of the maximum probability for Alice to
decode r successfully is a little bit more complicated. In
this case, ρ0 (for r = 0) and ρ1 (for r = 1) cannot be
diagonalized simultaneously, and the maximum proba-
bility p < (p0max + p1max)/2. But we can see that when
Alice chooses to decode r in the step (2), if the corre-
sponding projection succeeds, she immediately gets 1 bit
of information; while the projection fails, ρ0 and ρ1 col-
lapse to the same density matrix, i.e., the upper bound
of the average information that can be gained from the
resultant final states is zero. This fact implies that Al-
ice had already drawn as much information as possible
from the states she received. Therefore when r = 0 and
r = 1 occur with the same probability, the strategy in
that step is exactly the optimal one for her to get r with
the reliability 100%. The maximum probability of this
procedure is also p = 1/2. Namely, Alice cannot decode
q or r unambiguously with a probability higher than that
of the honest measurement.
As a result, if Alice makes her measurement without
using the correct method in the step (2) or even delays
her measurement until Bob announces which sets of |ψ〉
picked for the verification in the step (3-2), either she
cannot reach the maximum efficiency such that she has
to discard more data than what is allowed in the step
(3-1), or there will inevitably be some undiscarded q or
r whose reliability is only ε < 100%. She cannot pass
the test with a nontrivial probability, because in the step
(3-2) it is no longer allowed to discard the data that she
fails to decode. For this reason, Alice has to follow the
protocol honestly.
Repeating the above procedure, we can obtain the sim-
ilar result for the case in which Bob applies the minimal
measurement or other dishonest measurements. Bob has
to choose d = 0 and d = 1 with the specified ratio and
use the method in the step (4) to measure all ψB1ψB2 .
Else he will only have a probability O(δ)εO(δm) to cheat
without being caught.
From the above (I) and (II), we can see that the goal
of OT can be achieved, as long as the initial state |ψ〉
takes the specific form given in Eq.(1). This allows us to
proceed to the last but not the least part of the proof.
(III) Steps (3-3) and (5) are able to force Bob to pre-
pare the states honestly.
Proof: The step (5) requires Bob to show that he has
indeed input d for all the remaining |ψ〉 (i.e., he already
got c or s with the reliability 100%), while only about
m/2 sets are allowed to be discarded. Therefore for the
same reason in (II), in the step (4) the probability for
Bob to get c with the reliability 100% should reach 1/2.
We shall prove that, if Bob does not prepare the initial
states honestly, this probability will drop, or he will not
pass the test in the step (3-3).
Let us first study what constrain will be put on the
initial states by the step (3-3). There may exist many
cheating strategies for Bob. But they can all be described
by the following model. Bob sends Alice a quantum sys-
tem α which is entangled with another system β. He
performs any POVMs[22] on β to get as much informa-
tion as he can. A general form of the entangled system
α⊗ β is
|ψ〉 =
∑
k
fk |αk〉 |βk〉 . (26)
Alice can check the partial density matrix ρα =∑
k 〈βk |ψ〉 〈ψ| βk〉 of system α with her measurement in
the step (3-3). Therefore to make Alice believe that he is
honest, Bob has to prepare α⊗β in such a way that ρα is
much the same as that of ψA1ψA2 in the honest protocol.
Thus for each single set of |ψ〉, the state of such a system
can be expanded as [22]
|ψ〉 =
∑
r∈{0,1},q∈{+,×}
fr,q |r〉q |r〉q |Br,q〉 . (27)
Bob sends Alice the first two qubits, and keeps the last
part on his side as β. Generally β can include any systems
at Bob’s side and the environment, and even the systems
A1 and A2 from other sets of |ψ〉 at Alice’s side. But Bob
does not know beforehand which |ψ〉 will be picked for the
test in the step (3-3). So he needs to prepare β with the
following property: once the corresponding |ψ〉 is picked,
he can always measure β and get q, r unmistakably. Thus
β has to contain the systems on Bob’s side only, and all
the states |Br,q〉 with different q, r need to be orthogonal
to each other.
We now evaluate the amount of information on c that
Bob can obtain with such a state. Suppose that |ψ〉 even-
tually survives through the step (3). This state can be
expressed as
|ψ〉 = (
∑
r,q
fr,qΦ
+ |Br,q〉+
∑
r
(−1)rfr,+Φ− |Br,+〉
+
∑
r
(−1)rfr,×Ψ+ |Br,×〉)/
√
2. (28)
Since Alice already included this |ψ〉 in what she decoded
with the reliability 100%, if what she decoded is q, i. e.,
she has chosen c = 0, she must have found Φ− or Ψ+ in
her measurement. From this equation, we can see that
the system β must have collapsed into
|B′0〉 ≡
∑
r
(−1)rfr,+ |Br,+〉 /
√∑
r
f2r,+ (29)
or
|B′1〉 ≡
∑
r
(−1)rfr,× |Br,×〉 /
√∑
r
f2r,×. (30)
7Similarly, if c = 1, β must have collapsed into
|B′′0 〉 ≡
∑
q
f0,q |B0,q〉 /
√∑
q
f20,q (31)
or
|B′′1 〉 ≡
∑
q
f1,q |B1,q〉 /
√∑
q
f21,q. (32)
Therefore if Bob can distinguish {|B′k〉} from {|B′′k 〉}, he
knows Alice’s choice of c. Define
ρ0 ≡
∑
k
|B′k〉 〈B′k| /2 (33)
and
ρ1 ≡
∑
k
|B′′k 〉 〈B′′k | /2. (34)
The upper bound (Holevo bound) of the average infor-
mation Bob can get is
Iav = S[(ρ0 + ρ1)/2]− [S(ρ0) + S(ρ1)]/2, (35)
where the von Neumann entropy is S(ρ) = −Tr(ρ log2 ρ)
[23]. From the symmetry of the equation, it can be seen
that Iav will go to its extremum when Bob chooses fr,q =
1/2 for all r, q. It is found that this extremum is the
maximum. That is, if Bob prepares the initial state as
|ψ〉 =
∑
r∈{0,1},q∈{+,×}
|r〉q |r〉q |Br,q〉 /2, (36)
the probability for him to get c with the reliability 100%
will be maximized. In the previous paragraph, it is shown
that all |Br,q〉 need to be orthogonal. For illustration, it
is natural to choose
|Br,q〉 = |Q〉+ |r〉+ (37)
where Q = 0, 1 for q = +,×. Then
|B′k〉 = |k〉+ |1〉× , |B′′k 〉 = |0〉× |k〉+ (k = 0, 1).
(38)
We can see that ρ0 and ρ1 are diagonalized simultane-
ously in the basis that Bob uses in the projection in the
step (4). Therefore this projection is just the optimal
strategy for Bob to decode c, and the maximum proba-
bility for the decoding to be successful is 1/2. If Bob does
not prepare the initial state in this way, this maximum
probability cannot be reached as Iav is not optimized.
Similar to the proof in (II), the probability for him to
pass steps (5) can be made arbitrarily small as m→∞.
Combining points (I)-(III), we can conclude that the
probability for Alice to know whether Bob gets b or not
(or the probability for Bob to get b in more than 50%
of the cases) is expressed as O(δ)εO(δn) (or O(δ)εO(δm)),
which is arbitrarily small by increasing n, m. Also, unlike
the cheat sensitive protocols[24], the detection of cheat-
ing in our protocol will not cause the secret bit of OT
to be revealed. As a result, the present Protocol OT
is unconditionally secure. As our proof is based on the
density matrices of the quantum states, rather than on
a specific cheating strategy, our conclusion is general no
matter what computational power the participants may
have and what POVMs they may apply.
IV. RELATIONSHIP WITH THE NO-GO
THEOREMS
A. The Lo’s no-go theorem of quantum secure
computations
Though the above general proof of security against all
possible cheating strategies seems complicated, the rea-
son why this protocol can evade the cheating in the Lo’s
no-go theorem is clear. As mentioned in the introduc-
tion, the protocol does not satisfy the requirement (a)
(Bob learns a prescribed function f(i, j) unambiguously)
in Ref.[19], on which the no-go proof is based. This is
because Bob cannot learn the value of b unambiguously
in our protocol. Instead, he only learns b with the proba-
bility 50%. In the other 50% case, he has zero knowledge
on b. In addition, rigorously speaking, the outcome of
our protocol cannot be viewed as a prescribed function
f(i, j). The outcome depends not only on Alice’s and
Bob’s inputs i and j, but also on the quantum uncer-
tainty in the measurement. For example, in the step (4)
of our protocol, Bob’s inputting d = 1 does not mean that
he can certainly obtain the value of c. Due to the quan-
tum uncertainty in his measurement, he can only obtain
c successfully with the probability 50%. As a result, the
quantum state in our protocol is not the simultaneous
eigenstate of different measurement operators that the
participant uses for determining the parameters wanted
by him (e.g., s and c). He knows whether he gets a
parameter successfully only if the measurement is per-
formed. Then the state is disturbed, so that it cannot be
used to get more parameters. Thus the protocol is secure
against the cheating strategy in Ref.[19]. On the other
hand, the definition of all-or-nothing OT only requires
that at the end of the protocol, the two outcomes “Bob
learns the value of b” and “Bob has zero knowledge on
b” should occur with the equal probability 50%; while it
never requires that which outcome finally happens must
be controlled only by the participants’ inputs. Clearly,
our protocol satisfies the rigorous definition of secure all-
or-nothing OT.
B. The MLC no-go theorem of secure QBC
Our result does not conflict with the MLC no-go theo-
rem of secure QBC, because this no-go theorem does not
apply directly to QOT (otherwise the Lo’s no-go the-
8orem of quantum secure computation would be redun-
dant). Let P1 denote an all-or-nothing QOT protocol.
Surely it does not implement QBC automatically. In-
stead, another protocol P2 is needed, which makes use
of the output of P1 to accomplish QBC. The MLC no-go
theorem reveals that the entire protocol P1+P2 cannot be
secure. Then there are two possibilities: P1 is insecure,
or P2 is insecure (if not both). But as we already proved
rigorously in Sec. III, our all-or-nothing QOT protocol
is unconditionally secure against any cheating strategy.
Therefore the existence of the MLC no-go theorem im-
plies that secure P2 is impossible.
Indeed, though BC and OT are thought to be classi-
cally equivalent, “reductions and relations between clas-
sical cryptographic tasks need not necessarily apply to
their quantum equivalents”[25]. So far there are two
known methods to construct P2 in classical cryptography,
which all fail at the quantum level. One of the method is
to repeat all-or-nothing OT many times[3]. More rigor-
ously, according to Ref. [3], BC is realized by encoding
the committed bit as b = b1 ⊕ b2 ⊕ ... ⊕ bk, and send-
ing each bi from Alice to Bob through an all-or-nothing
OT process. However, the resultant protocol is insecure
because altering anyone of the bi can flip the value of
the committed bit completely. Alice can simply execute
the protocol honestly. If she wants to change the com-
mitted bit at the final stage, she simply announces one
of the bi dishonestly. Since Bob knows bi at half of the
cases only, Alice can cheat successfully with the proba-
bility 1/2. Thus the scheme is broken. Another known
method to realize BC from OT in classical cryptography
is to build an 1-out-of-2 OT[26, 27] from all-or-nothing
OT, and use the 1-out-of-2 OT to implement BC. But
once again, it has to rely on the classical equivalence be-
tween 1-out-of-2 OT and all-or-nothing OT[26], which
needs re-examination at the quantum level. As pointed
out in Ref.[19], classical reduction would be applicable in
quantum cryptography if a quantum protocol can be used
as a ”black box” primitive in building up more sophisti-
cated protocols. However, we found recently[28] that the
1-out-of-2 OT protocol built upon the present quantum
all-or-nothing OT protocol with the scenario developed
in Ref.[26] is not rigorously a ”black box” type quantum
1-out-of-2 OT specified in Ref.[19]. Especially, the inputs
of the two participants are not independent of each other.
Such a quantum 1-out-of-2 OT cannot be used to imple-
ment secure QBC with the method described in Ref.[29].
The reason lies in that the step (2) of the protocol de-
scribed in Ref.[29] is inexecutable as Alice’s input cannot
be completed before Bob’s input is entered. Thus the
method also fails. Of course there may exist other meth-
ods to construct P2, but due to the presence of the MLC
no-go theorem, they are all bound to be insecure. In this
sense, the classical reduction chain from OT to BC is bro-
ken in the present quantum case, and thus there exists
no logic conflict between the present secure all-or-nothing
QOT and the MLC no-go theorem of QBC.
V. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSIONS
In all, we proposed an quantum all-or-nothing oblivi-
ous transfer protocol based on quantum entangled states,
and proved that it is unconditionally secure against any
cheating strategy. It was also illustrated how the proto-
col evades the Lo’s no-go theorem of the one-sided two-
party secure computation, as well as that the security of
our QOT does not conflict with the MLC no-go theorem
of QBC.
The existence of secure QOT protocol is important
not only for multi-party protocols, but also for a bet-
ter understanding of quantum theory. According to re-
cent results[30], three fundamental information-theoretic
constrains, namely, the impossibilities of (i) superlumi-
nal information transfer between two physical systems
by performing measurements on one of them; (ii) broad-
casting the information contained in unknown physical
states; and (iii) unconditionally secure bit commitment,
may suffice to entail that the observables and state space
of a physical theory are quantum-mechanical. There-
fore, clarifying the boundary between the capability and
limitation of quantum cryptography, as well as the re-
lationship between classical cryptography and its quan-
tum counterpart, can certainly enrich our knowledge
for searching the answer to Wheeler’s query “Why the
quantum”[30].
Finally, it is worth pinpointing that a QBC protocol
somewhat similar to ours was proposed[31]: both proto-
cols start with a 4-level system on Alice’s side and rely
on a verification procedure to avoid cheating . However,
as pointed out by the authors, what they achieved in
Ref.[31] was merely an analog to OT, which does not
meet the rigorous security requirement of the OT defi-
nition; in fact, they merely attempted to use the analog
to realize a QBC protocol. In contrast, our protocol in-
cludes a further crucial verification on Bob’s side, pos-
sessing at least three advantages: (i) the strict require-
ment of OT is met; (ii) the stand-alone security is proven
to be unconditional; and (iii) it is convenient to modify
ours to be a p-OT protocol[26].
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